作　　者： ; ;

机构地区： 中山大学管理学院

出　　处： 《南方经济》 2006年第8期32-45,共14页

摘　　要： 应用实物期权博弈理论和方法研究在随机市场环境下,目标企业存在财务杠杆情形下,企业并购的时间和条件。研究表明,目标企业支付的息票越高,目标企业所在行业的波动率越低,行业的成长性越低,目标企业的最优保证金率越低。目标企业支付的息票越高,负债率高,将加速被并购。波动率延迟了并购。模型可应用于国有企业的产权转让,表明国有企业产权是可以定价的,依据是企业本身的价值,包括由现有的资产经营所产生的现金流现值和转让期权。价格的高低取决于所在行业的特征,市场的税率,并购者的期望,负债率等。根据前面的分析,国有企业所在行业的成长性越高,波动率越大,市场的税率越低,并购者的期望越高,产权转让市场越活跃,企业的负债率越低,国有企业产权转让的价格越高。通过公开拍卖是产权转让定价的最佳方式。 Using a real option game theory and method, under a stochastic market and assumption the target firm is both debt and equity financing, the paper analyzes the timing and terms of mergers. Research show that, the higher of debt coupon payment is, the lower volatility of output price is, the lower drift is, the lower of the optimal premium of target shareholders will be asked. The higher of debt coupon payment, the higher debt and the higher drift will speed up mergers. The volatility of output price will delay mergers. The model can be used to price for SOEs＇ s property right. Research shows that SOEs＇ s property right can be priced. The value of SOEs includes the value if it was to operate on its own forever, and an option to be sold. The SOEs equity right decided by the industry characteristics, taxes, the bidder＇ s expect and debt. etc. The higher of debt coupon payment is, the lower volatility.

关 键 词： 实物期权博弈论 财务杠杆 并购 国企产权转让

领　　域： [经济管理]