作 者: ;
机构地区: 广东外语外贸大学国际经济贸易学院
出 处: 《南开管理评论》 2006年第2期90-95,共6页
摘 要: 本文在分解的两权概念下,在兼顾股东与管理者、大股东与小股东之间代理问题的框架中,运用博弈论来分析不同制度环境下,这些利益主体的行为选择导致的治理问题,并对代表不同制度环境和不同所有权与控制权配置——英美模式、日德模式及东亚家族模式进行比较分析。我们得到的重要启示是:风险制造人与风险承担人应该对应;决策控制权与决策管理权应该分离;应通过强化各类市场竞争、完善控制权机制来构建高效的公司治理自适应体系。 The paper analyzes the behavior of three parts and agency problems with game theory and decomposed rights under different institutional environments in a framework, which gives attention to the conflicts of both shareholders-managers and controlling shareholdersminority shareholders. Then, it compares the governance mechanism of several representative modes, which is England-America modes, Japan-Germany modes and East-Asia modes. The significant revelation to our corporate governance is that risk-maker and risk-taker should coincided, or the control right and manage right of dccisionmaking should be separated. The effective self-adaptcd systcm of corporate governance depends on market system compctition and the cooperation of several control rights mechanism.