作　　者： ; ;

机构地区： 暨南大学经济学院经济学系

出　　处： 《云南社会科学》 2006年第1期58-61,共4页

摘　　要： 国企低效率的根本原因与其说是所有者缺位,不如说是国有产权残缺,也就是国有财产的收益权与控制权严重地不对称甚或分离。而造成国有产权残缺的主要原因是,国企作为国家的政策工具而背离了利润最大化的目标。但是,由国企的国有产权性质决定,国企只能作为国家的政策工具。因此,国企改革的实质是国企的功能再定位,而国企改革的过程则是其产业布局的调整。被人们所忽视的问题是,要不要以及如何把竞争性领域中的国企改造成够格的因而是有市场竞争力的公有制企业。 The root cause for the inefficiency of state-owned enterprises is not the absence of real owners but the truncated property rights, namely the asymmetric relationship between the right to benefit from and the right to control. The major cause for this is the deviation of state-owned enterprises used as a policy instrument from profit maximization. But, state-owned enterprises can be just used as policy instruments by their nature of state-owned property rights. So, the reform of state-owned enterprises is essentially the repositioning of the role of state-owned enterprises, while the process of the reform is virtually the adjustment of the industry distribution of state-owned enterprises. A question ignored by people is whether it is necessary to transform state-owned enterprises operating in competitive industries into real public-owned enterprises with higher competitiveness.

关 键 词： 产权残缺 外部性 政策工具 功能再定位 公有制企业

领　　域： [经济管理] [经济管理]