作　　者： ; ;

机构地区： 中山大学岭南学院

出　　处： 《数量经济技术经济研究》 2005年第11期112-121,共10页

摘　　要： 外部环境和产权结构影响了国有商业银行的激励机制,进而影响到银行的效益。由于银行承担了政策性的任务,本文将经营者的努力分为经营性努力和非经营性努力,并在Hol mstrom-Milgrom多重工作任务的委托代理模型的基础上,建立了两阶段博弈模型,研究不对称信息下所有者和经营者的双重激励问题。我们发现,政策性负担的存在直接扭曲了国有商业银行的激励机制,造成国有商业银行的低效率,单一产权制度造成了大量的灰色收入,不但降低了国有商业银行的经济效益,而且产生大量代理成本;平均主义分配方式导致国有商业银行经营者努力程度和整体经济效益的下降。本文最后提出了完善国有商业银行激励机制的政策建议。 This paper analyzes the current situation and restrictive factors of the incentive scheme in China＇s state-owned banks. For supporting for policy burden, the managers＇ effort is divided into the managing effort and the Non-managing effort. Based on the Multitask Principal-Agent model by Holmstrom and Milgrom, the article present a two-stage model of the dual incentive between principal and agent under the asymmetric information. We concludes. Policy-burden directly distorts the incentive scheme in state-owned banks, and leads to low efficiency of state-owned banks; Sigle property rights causes lots of gray income to decrease the manager＇s effort; Equality of income lowers the managers＇ effort degree and the economic profits of state-owned banks. We present some policy advices to perfect the incentive scheme in. China＇s state-owned banks.

关 键 词： 影响因素 激励机制 多重任务模型

领　　域： [经济管理]