作　　者： ;

机构地区： 广东外语外贸大学国际工商管理学院

出　　处： 《运筹与管理》 2005年第4期154-159,共6页

摘　　要： 本文将传统的双重加价模型扩展到包含库存因素的上下游厂商均为垄断企业、下游厂商为寡头垄断企业而上游厂商为完全垄断企业以及上游厂商为寡头垄断企业而下游厂商为完全垄断企业的一体化模型,着重探讨了库存成本和市场占有率对纵向一体化的影响。研究结果表明,只有在库存成本较低时,传统的结论才得以维持;一体化始终导致消费者福利上升而不受市场占有率的影响,但一体化使厂商的总利润增加要在市场占有率较高时才能实现。 In this paper , we extend the traditional double marginalization model into a framework of vertical integration between an upstream monopolist and a downstream monopolist, a downstream oligopolist and an upstream monopolist , an upstream oligopo!ist and a downstream monopolist, when inventory costs are taken into consideration. Our focus is on the discussion about the effect of inventory and market share on vertical integration. It is showed that the traditional conclusion is maintained if and only if inventory costs are relatively small, and vertical integration always increases consumer welfare regardless of market share, but it increases manufacturer gross profit only when market share is sufficiently high.

关 键 词： 产业经济学 一体化 博弈论 库存 市场份额

领　　域： [经济管理]