机构地区: 华中科技大学管理学院
出 处: 《管理工程学报》 2005年第3期127-131,共5页
摘 要: 在制造商主导的供应链中,分销商与制造商合作的程度,即销售渠道关系的强弱在[0,1]内的连续分布,可以看作市场化同企业化的不同组合。文章利用Stackelberg博弈分析了不同渠道关系对渠道产生的经济影响,将分销和直销分别看作[0,1]分布的两个极端情形,进行了重点探讨。在产品没有销售模式倾向的情况下,得出的一般性结论是:直销无论在产量还是价格,无论对制造商、整个渠道还是消费者都将产生积极影响。在理论上为解释渠道中的冲突和直销的成功提供了一个工具。 In a supply chain with the manufacturer as a leader, the relationship between manufacturer and distributor affect their performance.The paper observes a relationship distribution [0, 1 ] , using a game theory of Stackelberg model, presents an economic effect of different channel relationship on channel members. Especially, direct marketing and distrition, being both extremities, are discussed in details. For general products, a conclusion is drawn that cooperation will increase effiency, consequently direct marketing positively sells a lower price, a more quantity, and a more surplus then others. So it provides with a theoretical explanation for the prosperity of direct marketing and conflicts of intra-channel.