机构地区: 南京理工大学经济管理学院应用经济研究所
出 处: 《财经研究》 2005年第7期5-15,90,共12页
摘 要: 回顾经济学考察共享资源供给制度的理论模型(经典的和演化博弈方法)和个案调查的工作,针对共享资源自发供给发生这一类经典模型无法解释的动态过程,文章借鉴演化动力学模型,赋予合作与搭便车两类不同个体对共享资源具有不同的边际效用,即解释部分个体“利他”行为特征,采用群体繁衍时个体策略类型能被选择、保留和延续的动态处理,推导合作策略稳定收敛(共享资源产生自发供给)的条件———合作的边际效用大于非合作边际效用与合作成本之和,进而得出若干一般性的推论。 Aiming at the voluntary supply institution of shared resource, this article uses a dynamic evolution model to explain the evolution epuilibrium of cooperation and hitch hike, in which individual type is selected, saved and continued in a colony during a dynamic evolution process.By assuming that cooperators and free riders have different marginal utility in their payoff functions, we explore the stable conditions on which selection will operate for altruistic trait. We conclude that when the marginal utility of cooperating is larger than the sum of the marginal utility of free riding and the cost of cooperating, the voluntary supply institution of sharing resource will come into being. Finally, we get some corollaries.