作　　者： ; ; ; ;

机构地区： 西北农林科技大学经济管理学院

出　　处： 《当代经济科学》 2005年第1期31-35,共5页

摘　　要： 通过建立垄断政府工资成本最小化的最优规划模型发现,从政府官员总量角度看,政府机构不存在人员臃肿、人浮于事。但是,在官员资历工资制占主导地位的政府最优决策路径上,从政府官员构成角度看,政府机构存在人员冗余、工作低效率等情形,并且在政府最优决策路径上,资历工资制度将进一步强化官员工资刚性,扭曲垄断政府劳动力需求曲线;政府官员工资率与官员规模同步增长,从而,垄断政府机构中人员臃肿、人浮于事与高工资成本等现象并存。因此,资历工资是导致垄断政府各种弊病的根源,重建政府官员工资制度应成为垄断政府改革焦点与核心。 Through analyzing an optimal programming model, this paper finds that there do not exist such problems as overstaff and rigid staff wage from the total number of government staff. Yet, with experience wage institution, the government, on its optimal-decision, has gone into overstaffed and low-efficiency situation from staff construction. With government optimal-decision, experience wage will enforce the wage rigidity, distort the labor demand curve: staff wage will increase with their number. So such phenomena as overstaff, low efficiency, and high wage cost co-exist. Thus, the current wage institution purely based on experience is the key reason for government shortcomings. In conclusion, restructuring staff wage institution should be the focus of monopoly government's reform.

关 键 词： 垄断政府 资历工资 人员臃肿 工资刚性

领　　域： [经济管理] [经济管理]