作 者: ;
机构地区: 中山大学人文科学学院哲学系
出 处: 《哲学研究》 2002年第10期42-48,共7页
摘 要: 把某位思想家任意拔高、崇奉过甚 ,是中国思想史并不鲜见的一种现象。在有的学者那里 ,牟宗三也遭遇着类似的命运。有些论著称其为“近代以来的第一人” ,甚至还把未来中国哲学的发展与牟氏联系在一起。这种观念既缺乏历史的论证 ,又隐含着抽象的价值肯定 ;不仅不利于牟氏哲学及其与康德哲学关系的研究与评价 ,而且也不利于中国哲学以及中西哲学的比较与理解。本文在牟宗三的评价上虽然未必没有可以商讨之处 ,但其关于牟氏与现象学的具体研究值得注意。这种具体研究 ,较之那种“以讹传讹 ,得末行末”的盲目做法 ,不是更为可取吗 ? This paper tries to investigate the fundamental relations between Mu Zong-san's thought and phenomenology. According to Mu Zong-san's understanding of phenomenology, he has not found the common basic interest and orientation of metaphysics in Husserl, Neither has he found the method and approach shared in Heidegger. Therefore the distance between phenomenology and Mu Zong'san's thought, which is supposed to be shorter, is expanded facetiously. It should be Max Scheler's relative thoughts in ethics and phenomenology from the standpoint of phenomenology that can best embody this shorter distance directly. Totally speaking, even if there is no relationship of complete adequacy between Mu Zong-san and phenomenology, there is absolutely no relationship of radical opposition. It is more probable that there are various possibilities of mutual communication and supplement.