机构地区: 中国人民大学农业与农村发展学院
出 处: 《中国软科学》 2004年第11期23-26,共4页
摘 要: 本文分析了食品供给链中行为主体间在一次博弈、重复博弈和不完全信息动态博弈下的战略选择。分析表明,在市场中常见的一次性市场交易中食品供给链行为人会出于自身利益最大化的动机而选择不合作的机会主义行为。但是在无限期的重复博弈中,食品链中行为人会达成一种合作均衡,从而实现食品供给的安全性。更进一步的KMRW声誉模型分析认为,在食品供给链参与人类型不确定这种不完全信息存在的情况下,行为主体间也会在有限期的重复博弈中实现一定阶段前的相互合作。 This paper analyses players' strategy under single game, repeated games and dynamic game with incomplete information in food supply chain. It shows that players usually choose uncooperative opportunism for pursuing the maximum of personal profits in once game which is frequent in market. However, cooperative equilibrium may be achieved between players in termlessly repeated game so that food safety supply is insured. KMRW reputation model reveals that players can cooperate in finitely repeated game before fixed stage under incomplete information of uncertain player type. At last, this paper puts forward some pertinent suggestions.