作　　者： ;

机构地区： 南京大学哲学系

出　　处： 《南京大学学报（哲学．人文科学．社会科学）》 2004年第5期119-124,共6页

摘　　要： “Idee”概念的丰富性在胡塞尔现象学中得到了最集中的展示,但它的复杂性和易混性即使在胡塞尔那里也未得到一以贯之的课题化说明。通观胡塞尔的主要文本,“Idee”概念有三层含义:观念、理念和新理念。在这三层含义中主要包含两种关系:理念与新理念之间的关系以及观念与理念之间的关系。通过引入先天性、无限性、本质、直观、表述、基础与根据等现象学维度,可以对这两种关系进行深入的辨别和分析。这种辨析将会澄清我们对现象学的晦暗认识,使我们更好地理解现象学的思路、边界及其新的可能性。 The rich connotations of 'Idee' are revealed in Husserlian phenomenology in a most concentrated way. Even so, Husserl himself still failed to give a coherent explanation of its complexity and ambiguity categorically. Husserl's major works show there are three significations in the concept 'Idee': idea, Idea and new Idea, among which are two major relations: the relation between Idea and new Idea and that between idea and Idea. This paper takes advantage of such phenomenological dimensions as apriority, infinity, eidos, intuition, expression, basis and foundation to make a further distinction between and analysis of these two relationships. It may help to clarify our obscure knowl- edge of phenomenology and enable us to better apprehend the logic, the scope and the new possibili- ties of phenomenology.

关 键 词： 现象学 观念 理念 新理念

领　　域： [哲学宗教]