机构地区: 重庆大学经济与工商管理学院
出 处: 《中国管理科学》 2004年第4期28-32,共5页
摘 要: 市场上存在一个上游和一个下游企业时,纵向一体化能使上游企业的R&D投资、下游企业的产品产量和行业利润均增加。本文研究了在不进行纵向一体化的情况下,上下游企业之间是否能够通过谈判,达成契约,从而使上游企业的R&D投资、下游企业的产品产量和行业利润都达到纵向一体化时水平的问题。研究表明:如果上、下游企业进行两阶段动态博弈,该契约不会是一个子博弈精炼纳什均衡。只有上、下游企业进行无限次重复博弈,双方才有可能达成契约,并且双方都会遵守该契约。 When an upstream and a downstream firm exist in the market,vertical integration can increase the upstream R&D expenditure,the downstream output,and the industry profit.This paper studies the problem whether the upstream and downstream firms can sign a contract to increase the upstream R&D expenditure,the downstream output,and the industry profit to the level after the vertical integration.It is shown that,if the upstream and downstream firms play two-stage dynamic game,the contract is not a perfect Nash equilibrium.If the upstream and downstream firms play infinitely repeated game,the contract can be signed and abided.
领 域: [经济管理]