作　　者： ; ; ;

机构地区： 武汉大学

出　　处： 《经济经纬》 2015年第1期25-30,共6页

摘　　要： 笔者通过建立地方政府与农民之间的合约模型,分析了农民在强制性改革模式和参与式改革模式下的行为特征,并比较其福利水平。研究结果表明,存在农民参与改革意愿的帕累托最优概率,它使农民自身和改革效用同时达到最大化。农民参与改革的概率越大,其收益也将随之增加;反之,其收益降低,甚至将低于强制合约下的水平。农民的实质参与不仅能够提高其自身的福利,而且还有助于农村经济发展目标的实现。 By modeling the interactions between local governments and rural households under different constraints,this paper demonstrates the behaviors of rural households with and without their participations and compares their corresponding welfare conditions. We find that Pareto optimality of probability of participation exists,at which level both the interest of rural households and welfare condition of social reform reach maximum. In the meantime,the greater probability of participation of rural households in the reform,the more benefit can be reached. Otherwise benefit decreases,even will be below the level without participation.

关 键 词： 集中居住 合约 激励兼容 参与

领　　域： [经济管理]