作　　者： ; ; ;

机构地区： 暨南大学

出　　处： 《体育与科学》 2014年第4期101-105,共5页

摘　　要： 中国男子篮球职业联赛以筹备成立CBA联赛公司为契机,计划开始实施联赛的"管办分离"改革,这既是在中国社会经济转型背景下我国竞技体育管理体制改革的趋势使然,同时也是俱乐部与中国篮球协会这两个CBA联赛最为重要的利益主体长期博弈的结果。但"管办分离"能否真正实现取决于联赛的利益分配是否合理,这也是两个利益主体间的关系是合作抑或是冲突的重要基础。本文通过借鉴中国足球超级联赛的经验与教训,在博弈论的理论基础上构建演化博弈模型,尝试找出影响俱乐部与中国篮球协会博弈策略选择的关键因素,并由此析出CBA联赛收益分配系数,为双方相互合作共同促进CBA联赛的稳定发展提供理论依据。 As the preparation for the CBA Company,the league is planning to do the reform of 'Separation between government and organization'.Under the background of Chinese social and economic transformation,this reform is the request of the development of Chinese professional sport's management regime.Moreover,this is the outcome of the game between clubs and Chinese basketball association,which are two main parts of the league.However,whether the 'Separation between government and organization' would be literally fulfilled depends on the rationality of the revenue share,which is the most important factor to determine the relationship between the clubs and the association.Referring to the experience from the China Super League,this paper sets up an evolutionary game model which is based on the game theory,and finds the key factors which influence the strategy selection behaviors of clubs and association,and the reasonable allocation portions of the CBA league revenue sharing.The findings of this study provide a theoretical framework for the corporation between clubs and the Chinese basketball association.

关 键 词： 中国男子篮球职业联赛 管办分离 策略选择 演化博弈

领　　域： [文化科学] [文化科学]